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1. Summary    What happens when an expectation of a certain perceptible event 
is fulfilled? Traditional empiricist theories about intentionality, as well as several 
recent theories about mental imagery, emphasise the concrete similarity between 
expectations and perceptions. For example, one can almost "hear in one's head" a 
melody which one is anticipating. This has been the starting point for many 
theories which postulate some kind of similarity matching between the 
expectation and its fulfilment. According to such theories, an analogue mental 
representation of the expected fact is "held up" against the incoming percept, and 
their similarity or non-similarity determines whether the expectation is or is not 
fulfilled. 
If such theories are taken as descriptions of phenomenologically accessible facts, 
they are difficult to defend. First, analogical expectations - when they do occur - 
usually do not persist into the fulfilment phase. And how could they be matched 
for similarity, if they are not available at the same time? Second, many cases of 
expectation do not involve any imagery at all but only reveal themselves as a 
feeling of surprise if they are not fulfilled. 
The philosophical literature abounds with arguments against the thesis that 
concrete similarity to a certain percept is essential for an expectation to have that 
percept as its object. But of course these are not arguments against cognitive and/
or neural-network theories which entail that simultaneous matchings are 
performed below the introspectively accessible level; such an assumption is often 
used in explanations of perceptual learning. 
I here suggest a simple alternative theory of the nature of matching in such 
learning. Suppose that thought and perception alternate using the same 
representational medium, and that the contents of this medium are being 
continuously fed into the cognitive system which produces thought. Such a 
common feedback/input mechanism will, in itself, give rise to learning because 
at each alternation from expectation to perception, the system will perform an 
implicit matching. If the percept is sufficiently dissimilar to what would have 
occurred in the common medium without perception, the cognitive system will 
tend to switch to another region of its state-space, in which other kinds of 
expectations are produced. 
This learning process can take care of certain "hard" learning problems, 
especially, the associative learning of temporal perceptual patterns. I have 
suggested the name "natural resonance" for it (Malmgren 1991, 1996). 
2. Phenomenology of expectations     Suppose that you are familiar with a 
certain recording of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, and that you are just going to 
play it on the gramophone. Your expectations before it starts may well manifest 
themselves in the form of a temporally extended, clear and distinct imaginative 
presentation of the first five bars, "hearing them with your inner ear":  
   
This hearing with your inner ear is a process which is very similar to the actual 
hearing of the first five bars; for example, it takes approximately the same time 
and is accompanied by similar emotional reactions. When you listen to the actual 
music, the similarity may even strike you. But no copy of the original experience 
is displayed in parallel with the actual music. That would make a split mind, or at 
least a duo of every sonata. 
Also think of the case of a violinist playing the solo part of a concerto. Before 
the performance, he certainly rehearses it both physically and mentally. But 
while he is playing, his running internal anticipation of the next notes cannot 
possibly take the form of a continuously updated analogical rehearsal of these 
notes. Again, that would require a double musical consciousness. A fortiori, the 
fact that one of his anticipations is verified cannot consist in a match between an 
image and a percept. 
But then, what do we have analogical expectation for? My explanation is that the 
basic function of intentionality is to substitute for perception when no external 
information is coming in. For this it had better use the same system as 
perception, which tends to make expectations like percepts. A typical example is 
offered by walking while talking philosophy. You only have to visually attend to 
the road once in a while in order to update the internal picture of it. In between, 
the internal image works as well as a percept. The image is even as dynamic as 
the percept. If you just saw a stone in front of you, you can if you want still see 
the stone coming closer before your internal eye. But even if you don't think of 
it, you usually succeed in avoiding the stone. 
The last-mentioned fact also means that during the walk, an analogical 
expectation and the fulfilling percept often differ. You see a stone at some 
distance, you form a corresponding image of it, and you set your steps so as to 
avoid it. Then you concentrate on the philosophical talk. When the stone is close 
you take a verifying look at it. It is as big as you expected. But your image was 
small - how can they match, if they are so different? 
3. Matching in analysis-by-synthesis models     MacKay (1956) outlined a 
model for automaton learning which involves the comparison between the 
environment and an internally produced representation. An error signal is sent as 
input if a mismatch occurs. If the environment is reasonably stable this error 
signal (or repeated such signals) may lead to an adaptation in the sense that the 
internally produced representation eventually matches the environment. In 
cognitive science, this general scheme has become known as the "top-down" or 
"analysis-by-synthesis" model. As MacKay himself points out, the model can be 
developed in several directions depending (among other things) on how one 
conceptualises the error signal. 
Among recent ideas which conform to MacKay's concept are Grossberg's 
"adaptive resonance" theories (ART; Grossberg 1987). The input ("bottom-up") 
signal first activates a number of high-level neurones, and the neurone with the 
largest activity is selected by competition. The selection process is a matching in 
an abstract sense, since the neurone with weights which corresponds best to the 
input activity vector becomes the winner. In a second step, the "top-down signal" 
from the winning neurone is compared to the input. This step involves a 
matching in a more concrete sense, since the corresponding activities in two sets 
of neurones are being compared. (Two isomorphic hardware structures are 
needed!) If there is a large enough mismatch an error signal is sent, signifying 
that the input does not belong to any known category. 
Kosslyn (Kosslyn 1994) postulates a process which is similar to ART in many 
respects, but also essentially different. In perception, the perceptual data in the 
visual buffer are first "bottom-up matched" to prototypes and exemplars  stored 
in the "pattern activation systems". This is an abstract matching since the stored 
patterns are coded as network weights. If the first match is poor, the pattern 
activation systems generate an image in the visual buffer. According to Kosslyn, 
this image is not itself compared to the input, but simply "fills in" or "completes" 
the externally generated data (p. 121). It is true that his model also allows for a 
set of mechanisms for top-down hypothesis testing in certain perceptual 
situations (pp. 225 ff), but these mechanisms do not include a concrete image/
input matching. 
As shown above, simultaneous concrete matching requires duplicate systems. 
Hence I guess that Kosslyn's reluctance to believe in such a process is connected 
with his main thesis - with which I certainly agree! - that imaging uses the same 
brain system as perception. But if one rejects simultaneous concrete matching, 
how should one conceptualise the relation between analogical expectations and 
their fulfilling events? 
4. Natural resonance        In the present theory, too, the central cognitive system 
and the external world are modelled as feeding their data into a common  
medium. I will refer to the common medium as the "resonator" or "resonant 
element". In the simplest versions of the theory, the state of the resonator is 
supposed to be completely input-dependent, i.e., it has no memory of its own. 
The central (memory) system is a deterministic machine, taking its input from 
the resonant element. At each moment, the state of the resonator is determined 
either by the output from memory or by the input from the external world (the 
"external input"), but never by both. This is intended to be the counterpart (in the 
simple theory) to the alternation between thought and perception described 
earlier. Most importantly, the state of the resonant element is being continuously 
fed back to the memory system. Think of this as corresponding to the 
phenomenological fact that one does experience both the perceived world and 
the imagined one. (The resonant states can also be states of a motor apparatus, 
allowing for learning of behavioural routines.) 
To explain the working of a naturally resonant system in an simple way, I will 
now describe the case of a finite-state machine learning to follow an external 
rhythm. The system is illustrated below. 
Let us denote the resonant states with "1", "2" etc. While "thinking", the system's 
behaviour is completely state-dependent. So, if it thinks for a sufficiently long 
period it eventually becomes confined to one of a number of possible limit 
cycles, where one state rigidly follows upon another. The outputs, seen in 
separation, need not by themselves constitute such a deterministic (first order 
Markov) machine; a "2" may be sometimes followed by a "2", and sometimes by 
a "3". But the output sequences will repeat themselves in a determinate manner, 
forming a more or less complex rhythm. In the example, the internal rhythm is 
"3322..." 
A short period of perception begins and an external rhythm is heard, giving rise 
to a sequence of states in the resonator. Now, the sequence produced by external 
input during this period may be the same as - and in phase with - that which the 
memory would have produced, had it not been disturbed in its thinking. If so, the 
memory will not "notice any difference". If on the other hand there is a 
difference between the actual resonant state and the state which would have been 
produced by thought, the memory system may react to the different feedback by 
switching to another one of its possible limit cycles. So, a selectional process has 
been set in motion, which ends if an internal cycle is found which corresponds to 
the external rhythm; the basis of this process is that the system performs an 
implicit comparison between the actual input and a possible one. 
5. Natural resonance and "intelligent" learning      A simple naturally 
resonant system consists of an input-dependent deterministic machine A 
(memory), whose input R is at each time fully determined either by the 
transduced external input I (under the external constraint) or by the feedback 
from its own output O (under the "free-running" condition). Above, I have 
illustrated the finite-state resonant machine described above while learning the 
rhythm "3321". 
The process described here is not intelligent, since the search for a solution has 
no specific direction and there is no guarantee that a solution will be found or 
even approached. This is not a problem which belongs specifically to the present 
model; for example, any traditional top-down model using error signals from a 
simultaneous comparison must also face it. Positively, solutions used in other 
theories might be transferred to resonance models. It is however not my aim to 
discuss in general terms how resonant systems could be built which show 
gradual learning, but only to point to a new and potentially fruitful way of 
conceptualising the error signal. 
The argument used above to show that a resonant system can learn an external 
rhythm is actually valid for any outer constraint (invariant): if the system has a 
built-in capability to stably produce internal outputs which conform to the 
external constraint, it will tend to move to the region in state space where it does 
so, and to stay there. I will conclude my poster by illustrating this for invariants 
of the form "A is followed by B". 
6. Conditioning      It is generally believed today that feed-back networks are 
required for sequential tasks. However, there are as yet no biologically realistic 
models of error-correction in such networks. One advantage of naturally resonant 
systems is that they always use sequential information to correct their errors. 
Hence, they can be conditioned to specific input sequences. In a conditioning 
simulation (Malmgren 1991), randomly composed finite deterministic systems 
were used. Their transition tables were built in a uniformly random way except 
that for one input ("background") they were biased towards remaining in the 
same state. A large number of these machines were exposed to the background, 
interrupted by periods of "DBA" and "DB". At five progressive points of time it 
was noted how many systems stably outputted an "A" after having received 
"DB". As a control, it was checked at time 6 whether the systems stably 
produced "A" after having received "BB". The machines did tend to specifically 
learn DB => A; with 5000 systems the results were:  
  
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6
DB => A 143 603 665 699 712  
BB => A      176
   
Let me conclude with a speculation. The input to the brain follows paths which 
pass several relay stations and which converge and diverge in a very complex 
way. This allows for the coding of a huge number of different external 
invariants. Similarly, a great number of invariants can in principle be simulated 
in lower centres using the many feedback connections. With such huge potential 
capabilities available to mirror outer constraints, natural resonance may be a 
powerful learning tool and the basis of many of our adaptive abilities.  
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